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1 Introduction
The pricing behavior of firms over the business cycle has been the subject of an ongoing de-
bate among economists. In particular, there is a debate on whether price-cost margins and
profitability are pro- or countercyclical. One reason why economists pay attention to the pro-
or countercyclicality of price-cost margins and profitability is because they can either amplify
or dampen the effects of other business cycle shocks. For instance, high price-cost margins in
recessions keep prices from falling and hence may slow down the recovery process. Likewise,
low price-cost margins in booms keep prices low and hence boost demand and may extend the
boom. Moreover, understanding how market structure and prices respond to external shocks is
one of the core issues in Industrial Organization.
There is an extensive empirical literature on the cyclical behavior of prices and price-cost
margins. The evidence in this literature is mixed. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson (1986a,
1986b, 1987, 1988) find that price-cost margins in U.S. manufacturing industries are procyclical
in concentrated industries, but tend to be countercyclical in relatively unconcentrated industries.
Price-cost margins are especially procyclical in intermediate goods industries, in non-durable
goods industries, in capital intensive industries, and in low price–cost margin industries. Haskel,
Martin and Small (1995) obtain similar results for UK manufacturing industries.
Other authors, however, find strong evidence for countercyclical price-cost margins, in-
cluding Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) for U.S. data, Portier (1995) for French
data, and Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) for 14 OECD countries.1 More recently,
Nekarda and Ramey (2013) have revisited the methodology used by, among others, Bils (1987)
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Using updated empirical methods and updated U.S. data,
they show that prices over marginal costs are procyclical, conditional on technology shocks, and
1Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat find that price-cost margins are especially countercyclical in concen-
trated industries. They attribute this finding to “increased competition during economic booms” which is “likely
to be more apparent for the industries characterised by the dominance of large firms with market power.”
2
either procyclical or acyclical, conditional on demand shocks. These results hold both when
they use quarterly aggregate data on the U.S. private economy, as well as when they use annual
four-digit manufacturing data.
A possible reason why the empirical evidence is inconclusive is that entry and exit, and
therefore the structure of the industry, are also affected by business cycles. This suggests that
in order to fully understand how prices and price-cost margins vary over the business cycle,
one need to study the joint determination of industry structure and pricing. In this paper we
develop a simple theoretical model intended to examine the nexus between prices and entry in
response to demand shocks. To this end, we consider two firms which produce a homogenous
product and compete by setting prices. The two firms face a step demand function; the quantity
demanded and the willingness of consumers to pay are both larger in booms than in recessions.
The two firms differ in two respects. First, firm 1 is an incumbent, while firm 2 is a potential
entrant and needs to incur an avoidable fixed cost in order to enter the market. Second, firm 1
has a larger capacity than firm 2. We consider both the timing where firm 1 is the first mover,
as well as the opposite timing where firm 2 is the first mover.2
In spite of its simplicity, our model yields predictions on the cyclical behavior of prices,
price-cost margins, output levels, profitability, entry, and capacity utilization. In particular, we
find that entry, prices, and price-cost margins are all procyclical, regardless of which firm is
the first mover. By contrast, the average price in the market can be countercyclical if firm 2
is the first mover and firm 1’s capacity utilization can be either pro- or countercyclical when
firm 1 is the first mover. Moreover, our analysis shows that prices, price-cost margins, and
capacity utilization can be more or less volatile than the demand function. This implies that
entry deterrence by the incumbent firm can either amplify or dampen the effect of demand
fluctuations on these variables.
2When the two firms move simultaneously, our model is essentially a Bertrand duopoly with capacity con-
straints and hence it does not admit an equilibrium in pure strategies. We leave the characterization of the
resulting mixed strategy equilibrium for future research.
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The theoretical literature on the cyclicality of prices and price-cost margins can be
roughly divided into four classes of models. First, price-cost margins will be cyclical if ei-
ther prices or marginal costs are rigid. For instance, if prices are sticky while marginal costs
vary procyclically, then price-cost margins are countercyclical. This explanation, however, also
implies that profits should be countercyclical, which is at odds with empirical evidence (see
e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). By contrast, if marginal costs are rigid while prices are
procyclical, then price-cost margins will also tend to be procyclical.3
Second, several authors argue that price-cost margins are countercyclical because the
elasticity of demand is higher in booms than in recessions; the inverse elasticity rule then implies
that price-cost margins should be lower in booms. Warner and Barsky (1995) argue that demand
is more elastic in booms because each consumer wishes to buy more units in high demand states
(e.g., holidays and weekends) and hence price reductions in these states generate more sales. In
Bils (1989) and in Klemperer (1995), a firm faces a mix of repeat and new customers. The latter
have a lower willingness to pay.4 In booms, there are more new customers who respond to low
prices, so demand is more elastic than in recessions. Edmond and Veldkamp (2009) argue that
demand is more elastic in booms because consumers’ income, and hence buyers’ willingness to
pay, are less dispersed than in recessions. As a result, price reductions in booms attract more
consumers. In all of these models, however, strategic interaction among firms, which is the main
driving force in our model, do not play a role.
Third, some authors like Gottfries (1991) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), develop
models in which price-cost margins can be countercyclical due to capital market imperfections.
Firms face a tradeoff between raising prices and boosting their short-run profits, and keeping
prices low in order to build long-run market share. In Gottfries (1991), cash flows during
3For instance, Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson (1986b) argue that, due to a large degree of unionization
in concentrated industries, real wages, which are a main contributor to costs, tend to be rigid.
4In Bils (1989), the good is an experience good. New customers have a lower willingness to pay because they
are still unsure about the good’s quality. In Klemperer (1995) the lower willingness to pay is due to the fact that
new customers need to pay a switching cost when they adopt the firm’s product for the first time.
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recessions are low relative to liabilities, so firms give more weight to their short-run goals and
set high prices. By contrast, in booms, firms can meet their financial obligations, and hence they
give more weight to long-term goals which justify low prices. In Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996),
firms favor short-term goals during recessions because their low cash flow during recessions mean
that they face a risk of bankruptcy; this creates a debt overhang problem, which makes firms
more short-term oriented. They provide empirical support for their model using data from the
U.S. supermarket industry.
Our model belongs to the fourth class of models, in which the cyclicality of price-cost
margins is due to strategic interaction among firms. Green and Porter (1984) consider an
infinitely repeated oligopoly model in which firms are subject to unobserved demand shocks.
When sales are low, firms are unsure whether this is due to low demand or to deviation by a
rival firm from a collusive arrangement. To sustain collusion, firms start periodic price wars
when demand is low and hence the equilibrium features high collusive prices in booms and low
competitive prices in recessions.
By contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly
model with publicly observable i.i.d. demand shocks. During booms, when demand is high,
firms are more tempted to deviate from collusion and steal market share. Hence, the collusive
price must adjust downward to eliminate the incentive of firms to deviate.5 Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991) consider a model with deterministic demand fluctuations. They define booms
as periods in which demand is increasing and recessions as periods in which demand is decreasing.
Since the future gain from collusion is lower when demand is decreasing, collusive prices must
decrease to eliminate the incentive of firms to deviate. Hence, for the same level of demand, the
5Staiger and Wolak (1992) consider a related model in which firms must determine their capacities at the
start of each period before demand shocks are realized. They show that collusion tends to break down in periods
of low demand when firms have excess capacity. Ellison (1994) assesses the applicability of the Green and Porter
(1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, using data from the “Joint Executive Committee” railroad
cartel from the late 19th century. His estimates find some support for the predictions of the Green and Porter
model.
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collusive price is lower during periods of falling demand than during periods of rising demand.6
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) consider a model in which demand follows a Markovian structure
and identify booms with periods of fast-growing demand and recessions with periods of slow-
growing demand. They show that collusive prices move procyclically when demand growth rates
are positively correlated over time and countercyclically when they are negatively correlated over
time.7
In these models, demand fluctuations affect the ability of firms to collude. In our model by
contrast, demand fluctuations affect the incentive of an incumbent firm to either accommodate
or deter an entrant. Hence, our model yields results not only on the cyclicality of prices, but
also on the cyclicality of entry and capacity utilization.8 These results are essentially robust to
the whether the incumbent or the entrant are first movers. In addition, when the entrant is the
first mover, our model also gives rise to price dispersion and shows that it can be either larger
or smaller in booms than in recessions.
6Fabra (2006) shows that this prediction can be overturned if firms’ capacities are sufficiently small. Rosen-
baum and Sukharomana (2001) use data from the U.S. Portland cement industry and find support for Haltiwanger
and Harrington’s predictions that for a given level of demand, the price in the rising part of the cycle is above
the price in the falling part of the cycle and that profits reach a peak before market demand.
7Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1998) examine data on 19 U.S. industrial sectors over the period 1949–1987 and
show that price-cost margins are negatively related to the current state of demand and positively related to
expected future demand. This evidence is consistent with Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Bagwell and
Staiger (1997).
8Portier (1995) also studies the joint detremination of entry and prices in the context of a simple quantity
competition model with an incumbent firm, who acts as a Stackelberg leader, and a potential entrant. In the
equilibrium of his model, the number of firms is procyclical and the price (there are no marginal costs in his
model so the price is also the markup) is countercyclical. Another paper which considers a non-collusive model of
competition under demand fluctuations (but with a fixed number of firms) is Reynolds and Wilson (2005). Their
model predicts that during a demand expansion, firms charge the short-run competitive price, but in a recession,
they set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical
in their model. Consistent with this prediction, they find evidence from U.S. manufacturing industries that price
changes have higher variance in recessions than in booms.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. In
Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium under the assumption that firm 1 is the first mover and
in Section 4 we consider the opposite situation in which firm 2 is the first mover. Concluding
remarks are in Section 5.
2 The model
Two price-setting firms produce a homogeneous product and face a step demand function that
depends on the state of the economy, which is either a boom (state b), or a recession (state r).
In booms, consumers wish to buy Qb units and their willingness to pay per unit is αb, while in
recessions, they wish to buy Qr units and their willingness to pay per unit is αr, where Qb > Qr
and αb > αr. That is, consumers wish to buy more and are willing to pay more in booms
than in recessions. Albeit simple, this demand specification allows us to conduct separately
two interesting comparisons, namely between the variation in consumers’ willingness to pay and
equilibrium prices, and between the variation in quantities demanded and capacity utilization.
The two firms differ both in terms of their fixed costs and capacities. Firm 1 is an
incumbent that has no fixed cost and has a capacity normalized to 1. Firm 2 is a potential
entrant that needs to spend a cost F in order to enter the market with exogenous capacity k,
where
k < Qr < 1 < Qb < 1 + k. (1)
This assumption implies that firm 2 cannot serve the entire market even in recessions, firm 1 can
serve the entire market in recessions but not in booms, and together, the two firms can always
serve the entire demand.
Both firms produce at constant marginal cost c. Hence the average cost of firm 2 when
operating at full capacity k, is AC ≡ c + F
k
. To ensure that firm 2’s entry is never blockaded,
we assume that AC < αr. In addition, to restrict the number of different cases we would need
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to consider, we assume that
F >
(
Qb − 1) (αb − c) . (2)
This assumption rules out the possibility that in booms, firm 2 will enter the market by charging
a price of αb, above firm 1’s price, and will serve the residual demand, Qb − 1, left after firm 1
sells up to its capacity. In other words, this assumption means that in order to enter the market
profitably, firm 2 must undercut firm 1’s price (though as we shall see below, this is possible
only when firm 1’s price is sufficiently high).9
In what follows, we will characterize the equilibrium under two alternative scenarios: (i)
firm 1 sets its price before firm 2 decides whether or not to enter, and if so, at which price; and
(ii) firm 2 decides whether or not to enter and at which price before firm 1 sets its own price.
In both cases, the two firms know the state of the economy before they make their choices.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that although we consider a single period model, our
results can also be interpreted as the Markov perfect equilibrium of an infinite period model in
which demand is i.i.d. across periods and firm 2 needs to incur an avoidable fixed cost whenever
it chooses to operate in the market. We leave the more interesting case, where firm 2 needs
to incur a fixed cost only when it (re)enters the market after being out (but not if it already
operates in the market), for future research. This case is substantially harder because then firm
1 may wish to drive firm 2 out of the market in order to make it costly for firm 2 to reenter,
while firm 2 may wish to stay in the market even when it is currently losing money in order to
save on the cost of reentering the market later on.
9We should emphasize that assumption (2) is made for only for convenience. In a more general, but analytically
much more involved setting, firm 2 should be allowed to enter at a higher price if consumers’ willingness to pay
and/or quantity demanded are sufficiently high.
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3 Firm 1 is the first mover
Let pi1 be the price that firm 1 sets in state i = r, b, before firm 2 decides whether or not to enter
the market. Since the products are homogeneous, it is clear that if firm 2 decides to enter, it will
set its price, pi2, just below p
i
1, and will sell up to its capacity k. Firm 1 will then serve the residual
demand, Qi − k, at a price pi1. If pi1 is sufficiently low, then firm 2 decides not to enter because
undercutting pi1 entails a loss. Although firm 2 could still enter in booms by charging a price
above pb1 and then serve the residual demand not served by firm 1, Q
b − 1,10 its resulting profit
would be negative since (2) implies that
(
Qb − 1) (pb2 − c) − F ≤ (Qb − 1) (αb − c) − F < 0.
Hence, under (2), firm 2 will never enter the market by setting a price above p1. If firm 2 decides
to stay out, then firm 1 either serves the entire demand in recessions by selling Qr, or sells up
to its capacity, 1, in booms. Consequently, the profits of the two firms in state i = b, r are given
by
pii1 =
 min {Qi, 1} (pi1 − c) if firm 2 stays out,(Qi − k) (pi1 − c) if firm 2 enters, (3)
and
pii2 =
 0 if firm 2 stays out,k (pi1 − AC) if firm 2 enters. (4)
Firm 1 as the first mover has two options that dominate all others: (i) accommodate
firm 2 by setting the maximal price pi1 = α
i; or (ii) deter firm 2’s entry by setting a limit price
just below firm 2’s average cost AC, which is a feasible pricing strategy as AC < αr. Under
option (i), firm 2 will undercut αi slightly and will sell up to its capacity k. Firm 1 in turn will
serve the residual demand Qi − k. The resulting profits of firms 1 and 2 are (Qi − k) (αi − c)
and k (αi − AC), respectively. Under option (ii), firm 2 cannot profitably undercut firm 1, so
firm 1 will serve the entire market in a recession and will sell up to its capacity in booms (the
demand in booms exceeds firm 1’s capacity since Qb > 1). The resulting profit of firm 1 is then
Qr (AC − c) in recessions and AC − c in booms. Firm 2 in turn faces no residual demand in
10In recessions, Qr < 1, so firm 1 serves the entire market if pr1 < p
r
2.
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recessions, and due to (2), it cannot make a positive profit in booms by serving the residual
demand, Qb − 1. Hence, firm 2 will stay out of the market whenever pi1 = AC.
To determine firm 1’s equilibrium choice, note that since it can always ensure itself a
profit of (Qi − k) (αi − c) by serving the residual demand at αi, firm 1 will never set a limit
price pi1 such that
min
{
Qi, 1
} (
pi1 − c
) ≤ (Qi − k) (αi − c) .
Hence, the lowest limit prices that firm 1 will ever charge in booms and in recessions, respectively,
are
J b ≡ c+ (Qb − k) (αb − c) , Jr ≡ c+ (1− k
Qr
)
(αr − c) . (5)
Notice that J b > Jr since
(
Qb − k) (αb − c) > (1− k) (αr − c) > (1− k
Qr
)
(αr − c) , (6)
where the first inequality follows because Qb > 1 and αb > αr and the second inequality follows
because Qr < 1. Recalling that in order to deter entry firm 1 needs to set a price of AC both
in booms and in recessions, we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Suppose that firm 1 is the first mover. Then the subgame perfect equilibrium
is as follows:
(i) If AC < Jr, then firm 1 accommodates firm 2 both in booms and in recessions and both
firms charge αi in state i = b, r. Firm 1 sells Qi − k and firm 2 sells k.
(ii) If Jr < AC < J b, then firm 1 accommodates firm 2 in booms by charging αb, but deters
firm 2’s entry in recessions by charging a limit price pr1 = AC. When firm 2 enters in
booms, it also charges αb and the resulting quantities sold by firms 1 and 2 are Qb − k
and k, respectively. In recessions, firm 2 stays out of the market and firm 1 sells Qr.
(iii) If AC > J b, then firm 1 deters firm 2’s entry both in booms and in recessions by charging
a limit price pr1 = p
b
1 = AC. Firm 1 sells 1 in booms and Q
r in recessions.
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Intuitively, to deter firm 2’s entry, firm 1 needs to set a limit price equal to firm 2’s
average cost. Firm 1, however, is willing to cut its price only to J b in booms and to Jr in
recessions in order to deter entry. Equation (6) shows that J b > Jr, implying that firm 1 is
more eager to deter entry in recessions. The reason is that firm 1’s profit from accommodation
is lower in recessions than in booms because firm 1’s quantity, as well as its price, are procyclical
(Qb − k and and αb in booms versus Qr − k and αr in recessions). Although firm 1’s quantity
under deterrence is also lower in recessions than in booms (1 in booms and Qr in recessions), the
effect of booms on firm 1’s profits under accommodation is larger, so firm 1 is more willing to
accommodate entry in booms, and by implication, it is more eager to deter entry in recessions.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 (prices in recessions are in solid lines and prices
under booms in broken lines). When AC < Jr, firm 2 enters the market both in booms and in
recessions and both firms charge the monopoly prices αb in booms and αr in recessions. When
Jr < AC < J b, firm 2 enters only in booms and if it does, both firms charge the monopoly price
αb. In recessions, firm 1 deters entry by charging a limit price AC. When AC > J b, firm 1
charges a limit price of AC both in booms and in recessions and firm 2 stays out of the market.
An interesting implication of the fact that the price is αb or αr when firm 2 is accommodated,
but only AC when firm 2 is deterred, is that we get an inverse relationship between prices and
concentration: duopoly is associated with relatively high prices, whereas (contested) monopoly
is associated with relatively low prices.11
As Figure 1 shows, the interesting case arises when Jr < AC < J b because then entry
occurs in booms, but not in recessions. Consequently, the resulting market structure is state-
dependent: duopoly with high monopoly prices during booms, and contested monopoly with a
low predatory price in recessions.
11Our assumption that consumers have identical willingness to pay implies that high prices in our model do not
entail a deadweight loss. But since firm 2 needs to incur an entry cost, total welfare is higher under (contested)
monopoly than under duopoly. Moreover, consumer surplus is higher under monopoly due to the threat of firm
2’s entry into the market.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium prices when firm 1 is a leader
Proposition 1 yields the following predictions:
Procyclical prices: Prices are higher in booms than in recessions. The only exception arises
when AC > J b, in which case firm 1’s price is equal to AC both in booms and in recessions.
The question, however, is whether the equilibrium price variations merely reflect the change in
consumers’ willingness to pay. It turns out that the strategic interaction between the two firms,
and the potentially different industry structure in booms and recessions, has interesting effects
on the volatility of equilibrium prices, relative to that of consumers’ willingness to pay.
We will measure the volatility of equilibrium prices and consumers’ willingness to pay in
terms of their respective coefficients of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by
the mean. To compute the coefficient of variation, let β denote the probability of a boom and
1− β the probability of a recession. Then, the expected willingness of Consumers to pay, W , is
E (W ) = βαb + (1− β)αr,
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and its variance over the business cycle is
V ar (W ) = β
(
αb − E (W ))2 + (1− β) (αr − E (W ))2
= β (1− β) (αb − αr)2 .
Now the coefficient of variation of W is
CV (W ) =
√
V ar (W )
E (W )
=
√
β (1− β) (αb − αr)
E (W )
.
We now compare CV (W ) with the coefficient of variation, CV (p), of equilibrium prices.
The respective calculations are
E (p) =

βαb + (1− β)αr AC ≤ Jr,
βαb + (1− β)AC Jr < AC ≤ J b,
AC AC > J b,
and
V ar (p) =

β (1− β) (αb − αr)2 AC ≤ Jr,
β (1− β) (αb − AC)2 Jr < AC ≤ J b,
0 AC > J b.
Hence, the coefficient of variation of the equilibrium price is
CV (p) =

√
β(1−β)(αb−αr)
βαb+(1−β)αr AC ≤ Jr,√
β(1−β)(αb−AC)
βαb+(1−β)AC J
r < AC ≤ J b,
0 AC > J b.
It is easy to check that CV (W ) = CV (p) if AC ≤ Jr, CV (W ) < CV (p) if Jr < AC ≤ J b,
and CV (W ) > CV (p) if AC > J b.
We summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 2: The strategic interaction between the two firms has the following implications
for equilibrium price volatility:
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(i) If AC ≤ Jr, equilibrium prices exhibit the same volatility as consumers’ willingness to
pay.
(ii) If Jr < AC < J b, equilibrium prices are more volatile than consumers’ willingness to pay.
(iii) If AC > J b, equilibrium prices are less volatile than consumers’ willingness to pay.
Hence, the volatility of consumers’ willingness to pay and equilibrium prices is identical
only when AC ≤ Jr, in which case firm 2 is accommodated in both booms and recessions.
Whenever Jr < AC < J b, however, the equilibrium prices are more volatile than is the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay. That is, the equilibrium price volatility is amplified by firm 1’s
strategic decision to deter entry in recessions, because while the equilibrium price is equal to
the willingness to pay, αb, in booms, it is lower than that in recessions, as AC < αr. Finally,
if AC > J b, the volatility of equilibrium prices is zero, and thus obviously smaller than that of
consumers’ willingness to pay.
No price dispersion: Whenever firm 2 enters the market, the two firms charge the same price
so there is no price dispersion within the same period. As we shall see in the next section, this
is no longer necessarily true when firm 2 is the first mover.
Procyclical price-cost margins: We specify price-cost margins by the Lerner index. When
firm 2 is accommodated, the Lerner index of both firms is α
i−c
αi
. When firm 1 deters firm 2’s
entry by setting a price AC, the Lerner index of firm 1 is AC−c
AC
< α
i−c
αi
. Hence, the industry
Lerner index in state i is given by
Li =
 α
i−c
αi
AC ≤ J i,
AC−c
AC
AC > J i.
Since J b > Jr, it follows that Lb ≥ Lr, with strict inequality whenever Jr < AC ≤ J b (i.e.,
when the market is duopoly in booms and contested monopoly in recessions). As mentioned
in the introduction, the empirical evidence on the cyclicality of price-cost margins is mixed. It
14
should be noted that our results are driven by the fact that firm 1 finds it more profitable to
charge a low limit price and deter firm 2’s entry during recessions. But since we only consider
two firms, our predictions apply only to concentrated markets in which entry deterrence is a
relevant possibility.
Procyclical entry: To derive predictions about entry, let us assume that AC is drawn from
some distribution function G (AC) on the interval [0, αr], and is observed by both firms before
any decisions are taken. Then, Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium, the probability of
entry is G
(
J b
)
in booms, and G (Jr) in recessions, where G
(
J b
)
> G (Jr). This prediction
is consistent with Portier (1995) who shows that the number of firms in France is positively
correlated with the French GDP during the period 1977-1989. Likewise, Campbell (1998) finds
significant positive correlation between the entry rates in the U.S. manufacturing sector and the
U.S. GDP during the 1972-1988 period, and Lee and Mukoyama (2013) find that entry rates
of U.S. manufacturing plants during the 1972-1997 period are on average significantly higher in
booms than in recessions.
Procyclical profits and profit margins: When AC ≤ Jr, firm 1’s profit in state i is
(Qi − k) (αi − c). Since Qb > Qr and αb > αr, firm 1’s profit is procyclical. Likewise, when
AC > J b, firm 1’s profit in state i is Qi (AC − c), so again it is procyclical. When Jr < AC ≤ J b,
firm 1’s profit in booms,
(
Qb − k) (αb − c), is also higher than firm 1’s profit is recessions,
Qr (AC − c), since
(
Qb − k) (αb − c) ≥ Qr (Qb − k) (αb − c) = Qr (J b − c) ≥ Qr (AC − c) ,
where the first inequality arises since Qr ≤ 1, the equality follows from the definition of J b, and
the last inequality arises since AC ≤ J b. Hence firm 1’s profit is also procyclical in this range.
As for firm 2, its profit when AC ≤ Jr is k (αi − AC) which is procyclical since αb > αr. When
Jr < AC ≤ J b, firm 2 operates in the market and makes a positive profit only in booms; hence
its profit is also procyclical in this range. When AC > J b, firm 2 is out of the market in both
15
states. The procyclicality of profits is well-documented empirically (see e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1999).
Our model also yields predictions regarding profit margins, i.e., profits divided by quan-
tities. The profit margin of firm 1 is αi − c when AC ≤ Jr, αb − c in booms and AC − c in
recessions when Jr < AC ≤ J b, and AC − c in both booms and recessions when AC > J b.
Firm 2’s profit margin is αi −AC when AC ≤ Jr, αb −AC in booms and 0 in recessions when
Jr < AC ≤ J b, and 0 when AC > J b. Hence our model predicts that profit margins should be
(weakly) procyclical. This result is consistent with Machin and Van Reenen (1993) who study
a panel of 709 large UK firms over the 1970s and 1980s and find that firm-level profit margins
are strongly procyclical.
Pro- or countercyclical capacity utilization by firm 1: Clearly, if the industry structure
(and capacities) would stay unchanged over the business cycle, then capacity utilization would
vary procyclically, as firms produce more in booms than in recessions. The question is what
happens when the endogenous determination of industry structure is explicitly taken into ac-
count. In what follows we study the cyclical behavior of firm 1 which operates in our model for
all parameter values.
To address this question, recall that firm 1’s capacity is 1, so firm 1’s capacity utilization
is equal to firm 1’s output. In booms, firm 1 produces Qb − k if AC < J b and 1 if AC > J b, so
its expected output, and hence its expected capacity utilization, is
CU b1 =
(
Qb − k)G (J b)+ 1−G (J b) .
In recessions, firm 1 produces Qr − k if AC < Jr and Qr if AC > Jr, so its expected capacity
utilization is
CU r1 = (Q
r − k)G (Jr) +Qr (1−G (Jr)) .
Since Qb− k > Qr− k and J b > Jr, then (Qb − k)G (J b) > (Qr − k)G (Jr). At the same time,
if Qr is sufficiently close to 1, then it is also possible that 1−G (J b) < Qr (1−G (Jr)), so the
relationship between CU b1 and CU
r
1 is in general ambiguous.
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It is interesting to note that the capacity utilization of firm 1 in state i declines with J i,
which in turn varies with αi. Intuitively, the larger αi is, the more tempting it is for firm 1 to
accommodate firm 2, in which case firm 1’s capacity utilization is lower than in the case where
it deters entry.
As in the case of equilibrium prices, the question now is whether the cyclical behavior of
capacity utilization merely reflects the volatility of quantities demanded, or whether it is also
affected by the strategic interaction between the two firms. To address this question, note that
the expected quantity demanded is
E (Q) = βQb + (1− β)Qr,
and its variance over the business cycle is
V ar (Q) = β
(
Qb − E (Q))2 + (1− β) (Qr − E (Q))2
= β (1− β) (Qb −Qr)2 .
Hence, the coefficient of variation of demand is
CV (Q) =
√
V ar (Q)
E (Q)
=
√
β (1− β) (Qb −Qr)
E (Q)
.
We now compare CV (Q) with the coefficient of variation of the capacity utilization of
firm 1. Recalling that firm 1’s capacity utilization is equal to firm 1’s output, and noting from
Proposition 1 that firm 1’s output is Qb−k if AC < J b and 1 if AC > J b in booms and Qr−k if
AC < Jr and Qr if AC > Jr in recessions, the expected value and variance of firm 1’s capacity
utilization are given by
E (CU1) =

β
(
Qb − k)+ (1− β) (Qr − k) = E (Q)− k AC ≤ Jr,
β
(
Qb − k)+ (1− β)Qr = E (Q)− βk Jr < AC ≤ J b,
β + (1− β)Qr = E (Q)− β (Qb − 1) AC > J b,
and
V ar (CU1) =

β (1− β) (Qb −Qr)2 AC ≤ Jr,
β (1− β) (Qb −Qr − k)2 Jr < AC ≤ J b,
β (1− β) (1−Qr)2 AC > J b.
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Hence, the coefficient of variation of firm 1’s capacity utilization is
CV (CU1) =

√
β(1−β)(Qb−Qr)
E(Q)−k AC ≤ Jr,√
β(1−β)(Qb−Qr−k)
E(Q)−βk J
r < AC ≤ J b,√
β(1−β)(1−Qr)
E(Q)−β(Qb−1) AC > J
b.
It is now easy to check that CV (CU1) > CV (Q) if AC ≤ J b, and CV (CU1) < CV (Q) if
AC > J b. We summarize the comparison of CV (CU1) with CV (Q) in the following result:
Proposition 3: The strategic interaction between the firms has the following implications for
the volatility of equilibrium capacity utilization of firm 1:
(i) If AC ≤ J b, the equilibrium capacity utilization of firm 1 is more volatile than the quantity
demanded.
(ii) If AC > J b, the equilibrium capacity utilization of firm 1 is less volatile than the quantity
demanded.
Proposition 3 shows that the strategic interaction between the two firms either dampens
or amplifies the volatility of capacity utilization of the firm 1 which is the incumbent. This result
corresponds nicely to Proposition 2: when AC ≤ J b, i.e., when firm 2’s fixed costs is low relative
to demand, firm 1 finds it optimal to accommodate firm 2 at least in booms. The equilibrium
prices then are (weakly) more volatile than the willingness of consumers to pay, while firm 1’s
capacity utilization is (strictly) more volatile than the quantity demanded. In the opposite case,
where AC > J b, firm 1 finds it optimal to deter firm 2’s entry both in booms and in recessions,
and in this case, the equilibrium price and firm 1’s capacity utilization are less volatile than the
corresponding demand primitives.
18
4 Firm 2 is the first mover
We now turn to the alternative scenario in which firm 2 first decides whether or not to enter;
and if it does, it sets a price pi2 in state i = b, r. Firm 1 observes firm 2’s entry decision and
price and then sets pi1. This scenario corresponds to the Judo Economics model of Gelman and
Salop (1983), in which the entrant moves before the incumbent responds. In recessions, firm 2
sells a positive quantity only if firm 1 does not undercut it. In booms, firm 2 could also serve
the residual demand Qb − 1 when firm 1 undercuts it, but by equation (2), its profit would be
negative:
(
Qb − 1) (pb2 − c)−F ≤ (Qb − 1) (αb − c)−F < 0. Hence, firm 2 can profitably enter
the market only if it sets a sufficiently low “judo” price, which firm 1 does not wish to undercut.
From the previous section it should be clear that the required judo prices are Jr in recessions
and J b in booms. Obviously, firm 2 is willing to set these prices only if they exceed its average
cost AC. Hence,
Proposition 4: Suppose that firm 2 is the first mover. Then the subgame perfect equilibrium
is as follows:
(i) If AC < Jr, then firm 2 enters the market in both states and sets pb2 = J
b in booms and
pr2 = J
r in recessions. Firm 1 in turn sets pi1 = α
i and sells Qi − k, while firm 2 sells k.
(ii) If Jr < AC ≤ J b, then firm 2 enters the market only in booms and sets pb2 = J b. Firm 1
in turn sets pb1 = α
b. Firm 1 sells Qi − k, and firm 2 sells k. In recessions, firm 2 stays
out of the market. Firm 1 sets pr1 = α
r and sells Qr.
(iii) If AC > J b, then firm 2 cannot profitably enter the market in either state. Firm 1 then
sets pi1 = α
i and sells Qr in recessions, and 1 in booms.
Proposition 4 shows that the patterns of entry and output levels are exactly as in Propo-
sition 1. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that as in the case where firm 1 is the first mover, the
equilibrium prices when firm 2 is the first mover are also procyclical in the sense that they are
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higher in booms than in recessions (the prices in booms are αb and J b and in recessions they are
αr and Jr). Hence, the predictions on entry, sales, and the procyclicality of prices are robust to
the identity of the leading firm.
Figure 2: The equilibrium prices when firm 2 is a leader
As for price-cost margins, Proposition 4 implies that the industry Lerner index in state i is given
by
Li =

Qi−k
Qi
× αi−c
αi
+ k
Qi
× Ji−c
Ji
AC ≤ J i,
1× αi−c
αi
AC > J i.
Since αb > αr, J b > Jr, and Qb > Qr, it is clear that Lb > Lr when AC ≤ Jr and when
AC > J b. If we assume in addition that
Qb − k > α
r − c
αb − c , (7)
then
J b ≡ c+ (Qb − k) (αb − c) = αr + (Qb − k) (αb − c)− (αr − c)
= αr +
(
αb − c) [Qb − k − αr − c
αb − c
]
> αr,
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which implies that J
b−c
Jb
> α
r−c
αr
. This ensures in turn that Lb > Lr when Jr < AC ≤ J b. Hence,
as in the case where firm 1 is the first mover, here (under the additional constraint (7)), we also
get procyclical price-cost margins.12
Proposition 4 also implies that the procyclicality of profits is robust to the identity of the
first mover. To see why, note that firm 1’s profit in state i is (Qi − k) (αi − c) when AC ≤ Jr
and Qi (AC − c) when AC > J b. Since Qb > Qr and αb > αr, firm 1’s profit is procyclical in
both cases. When Jr < AC ≤ J b, firm 1’s profit is (Qb − k) (αb − c) in booms and Qr (αr − c)
in recessions. Noting that Qr ≤ 1, (7) ensures that firm 1’s profit is also procyclical in this
case. Firm 2’s profit is also procyclical since it is equal to k (αi − AC) if AC ≤ Jr, and if
Jr < AC ≤ J b, firm 2 operates in the market and makes a positive profit only in booms.
Although Propositions 1 and 4 generate similar predictions regarding entry, sales quanti-
ties, prices, price-cost margins, and profits, there are at least two important differences between
the case where firm 1 is the first mover and the opposite case where firm 2 is the first mover.
First, Figures 1 and 2 show that when firm 2 is the first mover, the equilibrium prices are weakly
lower for firm and strictly lower for firm 2. The reason is that when firm 2 is the first mover,
it must set at low judo prices to induce firm 1 to accommodate it. By contrast, when firm 1 is
the first mover, it accommodates entry by setting high monopoly prices. In this sense, we get a
more competitive outcome when firm 2 is the first mover than when firm 1 is the first mover.
Second, the low judo price that firm 2 sets when it enters the market gives rise to price
dispersion. This is in contrast to Proposition 1 where the two firms set the same price when
they are both active in the market. To examine how the extent of price dispersion varies over
the business cycle, let us measure price dispersion in state i by the coefficient of variation of
prices.13 To this end, note that the average price in state i = b, r is
p̂i =
Qi − k
Qi
αi +
k
Qi
J i = αi − k (α
i − J i)
Qi
,
12It should be noted that combined, (1) and (7) require that α
r−k
αb−k < Q
b − k < 1. That is, the gap between
Qb and k is not too small and not too large.
13This is a common measure of price dispersion, see e.g., Table 1 in Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, (2006).
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and the variance of price in state i = b, r is
V ar
(
pi
)
=
Qi − k
Qi
(
αi − p̂i)2 + k
Qi
(
J i − p̂i)2 = Qi − k
Qi
× k
Qi
× (αi − J i)2 ,
where Q
i−k
Qi
is the market share of firm 1 and k
Qi
the market share of firm 2. Using these
expressions, the coefficient of variation of prices in state i = b, r is
CV
(
pi
)
=
√
V ar (pi)
p̂i
=
√
k (Qi − k) (αi − J i)
Qiαi − k (αi − J i) .
Noting that αb − J b = (αb − c) (1 + k −Qb) and αr − Jr = (αr − c) k
Qr
, and simplifying, yields
CV
(
pb
)
=
√
Qb
k
− 1
Qb
k
1
1+k
(
1−Qb
k
) αb
αb−c − 1
, CV (pr) =
√
Qr
k
− 1(
Qr
k
)2 αr
αr−c − 1
.
It turns out that CV
(
pb
)
could be above or below CV (pr).
An interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that although both firms charge higher
prices in booms than in recessions, the average price paid by consumers is not necessarily
procyclical. To see this, consider the case where Jr < AC ≤ J b, so that firm 2 enters in booms,
but stays out in recessions. Then the average price in booms is p̂b. In recessions, firm 2 stays out
of the market and firm 1 serves the entire market at a price αr. If (7) holds, then J b > αr, which
implies in turn that p̂b > αr; hence, the average price is higher in booms than in recessions.
However, if (7) fails, then αr > p̂b whenever
αr > αb − k (αb − c)(1 + k
Qb
− 1
)
. (8)
Hence when (8) holds, the average price in booms is lower than in recessions. The reason for
this counterintuitive possibility is a composition effect: although firm 1 charges higher prices in
booms than in recessions, firm 2 enters the market only during booms, and its price is lower
than firm 1’s price. When firm 2’s price, J b, is sufficiently below firm 1’s price in recessions, αr,
the average price in booms will end up being below the average price in recessions. Notice that
this case arises only when αr is sufficiently close to αb.
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We report these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5: When firm 2 is the first mover,
(i) there is price dispersion whenever firm 2 enters the market;
(ii) the extent of price dispersion can be pro- or counter-cyclical;
(iii) the average price during booms is below the average price during recessions if (8) holds.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 suggests that price dispersion can arise due to the low price
that firm 2 sets in order to induce firm 1 to accommodate it. While this result replicates the
familiar judo economics result, part (ii) of Proposition 5, which as far as we know is novel,
shows that the extent of price dispersion varies over the business cycle and can either be pro- or
countercyclical. Evidence for procyclical price dispersion is found Cornia, Gerardi, and Shapiro
(2012). They examine the prices of domestic, direct, coach-class airline tickets in the U.S. over
the period 1993 to 2009 and find that price dispersion is highly pro-cyclical, especially for legacy
carriers and especially when concentration is high.
A number of papers have documented that retail prices for many products tend to fall
during periods of peak demand (see e.g., Warner and Barsky (1995), MacDonald (2000), and
Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003)). Part (iii) of Proposition 5 suggests that this phenomenon
may be due to a composition effect: lower price firms increase their market shares when demand
peaks, and this may lead to an overall decrease in average prices. Interestingly, Hatzitaskos
and Nevo (2006) use the Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) data and find support for the
existence of a composition effect.14
14For insatnec, they find that when the demand for tuna peaks during Lent, much of the increase in sales is
due to two relatively cheap products, whose market share is tripled despite the fact that their prices do not fall.
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5 Concluding remarks
We develop a simple model intended to explore the joint determination of prices, sales, and entry
and examine how they vary over the business cycle. Our model is based on the idea that demand
fluctuations affect the incentives of an incumbent firm to set low prices to keep a potential entrant
out of the market. It predicts that prices, price-cost margins, and entry are all procyclical,
but capacity utilization by the incumbent firm can be either pro- or countercyclical when the
incumbent if the first mover and price dispersion can also be either pro- or countercyclical when
the entrant is the first mover. Our model also shows that entry deterrence by the incumbent firm
can either amplify or dampen the effect of demand fluctuations on prices, price-cost margins,
and capacity utilization.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our paper belongs to the class of models in which the
cyclical behavior of prices and price-cost margins (as well as entry and capacity utilization) is
due to strategic interactions among firms. Most other papers in this class study the effect of
demand fluctuations on the ability of firms to collude. The two most influential papers in this
class are Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). In Green and Porter
(1984) collusion can be sustained in high demand states, but it completely breaks down in low
demand states because firms cannot tell if their low sales are due to low demand, or due to a
deviation from the collusive agreement by a rival. Hence like in our model, their model predicts
procyclical prices and price-cost margins. By contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) predict
countercyclical price-cost margins, which is the opposite of what our model predicts. In both
models, symmetric firms are assumed to operate at unlimited capacity. At least the Rotemberg
and Saloner result is clearly driven by this assumption. Also, unlike our paper, neither paper
allows for entry and exit and hence these papers do not generate predictions regarding the joint
determination of prices, price-cost margins, and entry.
Finally, the firms in our model have asymmetric capacities. Compte, Jenny and Rey
(2003) show that asymmetric capacities hinder the ability of firms to collude if the aggregate
capacity of all active firms is small relative to market size, but may facilitate collusion otherwise.
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To the extent that the market expands in booms and contracts in recessions, their results suggest
that collusion should be harder to sustain in booms than in recessions. Contrary to our results,
this would generate countercyclical price-cost margins.
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